I.
Introduction
The
armed struggle of the Moros in South Philippines for the defense
of their national freedom, independence and in upholding their
right to self-determination is one of the world's longest,
bloodiest, most brutal and most expensive wars. This began in
early 16th century when the Spaniards came to the Philippines
and still continues to this day.
In this stage of
Bangsamoro contemporary struggle beginning in the sixties, this
war has claimed the lives of more than 200,000 Moros, hundreds
of thousand rendered homeless; and more than half -a million
Moro refugees in Sabah, Malaysia, fleeing the wrath of War in
Mindanao, and other undetermined number of refugees in other
parts of the country.
Finding
herself endangered, and in frantic bid to solve the problem, the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) sought the
assistance and the active participation of the Organization of
the Islamic Conference (OIC) to mediate and broker peace between
the two parties. The GRP promised to grant meaningful Political
Autonomy to the Bangsamoro People. When the Bangsamoro people,
thru the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), with the active
participation OIC entered into formal peace talk with the GRP,
with a desire to arrive at a just political settlement to the
problem and resulting to what is known now as Tripoli Agreement of
1976, the Bangsamoro people did the unthinkable. The Bangsamoro
people; for the sake of peace, and in deference to the OIC and
its brotherly member-states, made the unthinkable, made at least
two great and supreme compromises:
a)
The compromise or loss of almost fifty percent (50%) of
Bangsamoro Homeland Mindanao and Sulu
b)
The loss of Political Independence for uncertain autonomy
Despite
all these sacrifices, and almost three decades after the signing
of the historic Tripoli Agreement, the Moros practically got
nothing. They are shod-changed if not ostensi61ycheated by its
GRP counterpart.
II. The 1996
Peace Agreement
The 1996
Peace Agreement (1996 PA), entitled the Peace Agreement - the
Final Agreement on the implementation of the 1976 Tripoli
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
with the participation of the Organization of Islamic Conference
(OIC) was signed in Malacanang, Manila, on September 2, 1996 in
the presence of former President Fidel V. Ramos, H.E. Chairman
Nur Misuari, representing MNLF, H.E. Ambassador Manuel Yan,
representing GRP. His Excellency Ali Alatas, Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Indonesia, representing OIC Ministerial Committee of
the Six, and His Excellency Dr. Hamid Al-Gabid, Secretary
General of the OIC.
The
1996 Peace Agreement, claimed allegedly as the final
implementation of the Tripoli Agreement, both in letter and
spirit, but actually to sabotage the same, is envisioned to
provide meaningful autonomy to the Moros, to bring about much
needed political leeway, socio-economic development, social
justice and lasting peace. But as the things stand now, almost a
decade already after its historic signing, nothing significant
happened and nothing substantial achieved. As an evidence of
this fact is the continued marginalization of the Moros
politically, economically, socially and physically, the
ever-increasing incidence of poverty, the deterioration of peace
and order brought about by the relentless and dubious
anti-terrorism campaign of GRP in Morolands, and still, the more
unequivocal evidence is the massacre of the innocent Moro
civilians in Sulu that led to the resumption of Moro-Filipino
war in February 1, 2005, wherein Philippine colonial forces
suffered a heavy casualties.
Inquiries
are already made as to what really prompted the resumption of
this war. There are two opposite versions, the GRP's version and
the Moro's version. But as far as the latter's version is
concerned, it was the brutal massacre of the innocent Moro
innocent civilians by the GRP's colonial forces that prompted
this, (See attached annex A)
The
Moros have many reasons to thank for this unwelcome war, not
because that they love it, but rather because, through it, the
GRP's machination, duplicity and sinister plot to defeat the
very intent and purpose and the spirit of the agreement(s) by
not fully implementing them, has been brought into sharp focus.
This is made possible through the GRP's unilateral and arbitrary
interpretation of the salient provisions of the agreement(s) and
worsened by the absence of strong and persuasive third party to
monitor the "correctness" of the implementation. This also
reveals the real color and the bad design of the GRP vis-a-vis
the Moro people.
Now,
as a result of this resumption of war, attention has been
focused not only to the implementation of the 1996 Peace
Agreement but also the agreement itself. In fact, Congressional
hearings in both Houses of Congress, the House of
Representatives and the Senate, have been conducted to determine
the causes of the resumption of the Moro- Filipino war and to
study the degree and extent of the implementation. (See attached
annexes B & C).
Contrary to the
much avowed-claim of the GRP, 1996 Peace Agreement had not been
fully implemented or has been inadequately implemented. (See
attached exhibit E for detals).
Had this
agreement been given the chance to work, prosper, and take its
course, instead of being mangled, watered down and tinkered
with, there would have been peace in the Moro Homeland instead
of war, there would have been development instead of sufferings
and poverty, and their would have been much needed peaceful
co-existence instead of mutual hatred and suspicion.
Much
opportunities and time had been 1qst since the first signing of
Tripoli Agreement in 1976. Twenty (20) precious years was
unnecessarily lost until the final agreement was signed in
Manila in September 2, 1996. Between this intervals thousand of
lives were dissipated. Almost a decade from now, almost nine (9)
years already, to be exact, since the signing of 1996 Peace
Agreement nothing significant happened, and nothing substantial
achieved. Time is of the essence. Time is of utmost importance.
The forces of destruction are now knocking at the door and the
darkness of war is now threatening to engulf again the Moro
Homeland.
It is about time
to save the 1996 Peace Agreement by saving it~ precious lives
and properties are saved, and further by saving it, humanity and
history are saved. So, let those who have stakes in this matter
sincerely and unselflessly join hands and grab the situation
from slipping out of control.
III.
Current Situation
After
the outbreak of Moro-Filipino war few months ago, or starting
February 1,2005, the situation in Bangsamoro Homeland is very
much volatile with the potential of escalating into full'-blown
war. In fact sporadic skirmishes are going on not only in Sulu
but also in other parts of Mindanao. This situation is
exacerbated by the absence of formal ceasefire. There have been
persistent calls from various quarters like the Philippine
Congress, Catholic Bishop Conference of the Philippines (CBCP)
and other influential organizations for the GRP to agree into
ceasefire, but the latter vehemently refuses. President
Macapagal Arroyo is so intransigent and headless to the call for
ceasefire and maybe because she wants to exact vengeance from
the Moro people. (See attached annex G and the newspaper
clippings)
It
is well to reiterate here for the sake of record that neither
the MNLF freedom fighters started it nor precipitated it. On the
contrary, it was the GRP side. There are many reasons why it is
so. The cumulative effects of the GRP Human Rights violations,
military abuses, harassment, illegal arrest and detention are
responsible for this war. The illegal and unjust detention of
H.E. Chairman Nur Misuari and the Muslims in Camp Bagong Diwa in
Bicutan and the arrest of Muslim converts in Islamic Da' wah
Council including some Ustadzes serve as good examples. Those
illegally detained are mistreated so much so that they are
forced to commit suicide inside the detention cell. A good
example of this is Tambuyong Bungkak, a Muslim detainee who
committed suicide by fighting the police authorities.
War in Mindanao
is a lucrative business to GRP's military generals. The Oakwood
mutiny in Manila in July 2003 where the Young Military Officers
exposed the corruption in military establishment is an ample
testimony to this claim; They even revealed it is the military
who ordered the bombing of innocent civilians, of the mosques
like the one in Davao and other places and then they attributed
the terrorist acts to Muslims. Muslims are always the victims of
the military's penchant for war. (See newspaper clippings)
As if this
massacre of the innocent Moro civilians is not enough, the
military and other police secret service are making illegal
arrest of Moros, and unjustly detaining them. Some of these
detained are already languishing in jail without charges. This
policy really scares the ordinary Moro. Some even stop going to
mosque out of fear of being apprehended and summarily executed.
If the above is
the GRP policy to the ordinary Moro civilians, the policy
applied to Moro leaders is divide and rule policy. As of this
date, the GRP has already succeeded in creating about four
splinter groups within the MNLF.
The GRP really
finds MNLF Chairman H.E. Prof; Nur Misuari, now unjustly
detained in jail difficult to be co-opted. (See Annex D) It must
be remembered, that there are many provisions in the 1996 Peace
Agreement which are not fully implemented which Chairman Misuari
does not approve and this evidently displeases the GRP.
Republic
Act 9054, supposedly the final implementation of the agreement,
is not acceptable to MNLF because of clear and blatant
violations thereof. The GRP is already hell-bent in making the
MNLF accept the fait accompli, and sensing that MNLF Chairman
H.E. Prof; Nur Misuari would not accede to their dubious plan,
the GRP proceeded by removing him from the scene, created and
subsequently recognized other splinter groups.
This is the
current situation in Bangsamoro Homeland. As it is already
emphasized earlier that the Moros already lost two significant
things as a result of the Tripoli Agreement - the diminution of
their territory and loss of independence – now, the Moros lose
another thing – Autonomy. What shall the Moros loss next? Is it
not logical that the Moros shall lose their very physical
existence like what happened to Muslim Spain? (See attached
annexes F to M)
IV.
Recommendation
The
following are highly recommended:
1.
The immediate convening of the tri-party meeting/conference -
the MNLF under H.E, Chairman Nur Misuari, GRP and OIC – to
review the implementation of the 1996 Peace Agreement.
2.
The immediate sending of OIC team of Secretariat General and the
Committee of Eight (8) to investigate the recent massacre in
Sulu, the unjust detention of H. E. Chairman Nur Misuari and his
companions, the illegal detention of Muslims in Camp Bagong Diwa
in Bicutan.
3.
The immediate implementation of the massive socio-economic
development plan or mini-Marshall plan as provided for under the
agreement
The
1996 GRP-MNLF -OIC PEACE AGREEMENT
THE UNACCOMPLISHED MISSION
I. The High
Contracting Parties and Signatories
The 1996
peace accord entitled the PEACE AGREEMENT- THE FINAL AGREEMENT
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1976 TRIPOLI AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (GRP) AND THE MORO
NATI9NAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF) WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE
ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE OF THE
SIX AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC
CONFERENCE (OIC) was signed in Malacañang, Manila, on September
1, 1996 in the presence of former President H.E. Fidel V. Ramos,
by H.E. Chairman Nur Misuari representing the MNLF, Ambassador
Manuel Yan representing GRP, H.E. Mr. Ali Alatas, Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, representing the
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) Ministerial Committee
of the Six, as Chairman, and H.E. Dr. Hamid Al-Gabid, the
Secretary-General of the OIC.
II.
1976 Tripoli Agreement as Mother Agreement
The 1996 Peace
Agreement (1996 PA) is an implementation of the unresolved
stipulations under the mother agreement-- the GRP-MNLF Tripoli
Agreement (TA) signed in Tripoli, Libya on December 23, 1976.
Under the Tripoli Agreement the GRP provides for the
establishment of an Autonomous Government for the Muslims in
Southern Philippines within the territorial integrity and
sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines specifically in
the “13 provinces and all cities and villages situated therein".
Such Autonomous Government shall have powers on the following:
1.
Shari'ah
2.
Education "
3.
Administrative System
4.
Economic and Financial System
5.
Special Regional Security Forces
6.
Legislative Assembly and Executive Council
7.
Mines and Mineral Resources
The
other points agreed were;
1.
The convening of a Mixed Committee to discuss later, among
others, the foregoing points;
2.
The establishment of a Provisional Government immediately; after
the signing of the agreement to handle preparations for the
Regular Autonomous Government;
3.
Observance of the Philippine constitutional processes in the
estab1ishment of the autonomous government (decried by H.E.
Chairman Nur Misuari as unilateral insertion by the GRP).
Unfortunately the
Mix Committee Meeting was not convened for the next 17 years and
the Provisional Government was never established. In the
meantime the peace talks collapsed in 1977 and hostilities
recurred between the GRP and the MNLF until 1986. For a period
stretching from 1976 to 1992 the 1976 Tripoli Agreement was not
complied with by two presidents-- late President Ferdinand
Marcos and former President Corazon Aquino. Marcos established
his own version of autonomy in Regions IX and X in Mindanao and
Corazon Aquino modified the Marcos autonomy by causing the
passage of Republic Act 6734 which created the Autonomous
Regional Government in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) contravening the
1976 Tripoli Agreement.
III.
Rectifying Past Mistakes
In 1992, following
the peace initiatives of former president Fidel V: Ramos with
the active participation of the OIC through the OIC Ministerial
Committee of the Six chaired by the Republic of Indonesia, the
GRP and the MNLF, met in Cipanas, West Java, Indonesia for the
Second Exploratory Talks on April 13-16, 1993 leading to the
signing of the Cipanas Statement of. Understanding whereby the
parties agreed that the "agenda for the talks will focus on the
modalities for the full implementation of the Tripoli Agreement
in letter and spirit". This led to the historic signing of the
Peace Agreement on September 2, 1996.
IV. The 1996
Peace Agreement In Substance
A. Phase I
Provides
for a transitory period of three years from September 2, 1996
-
Establishment of Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD)
covering the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga
del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, North Cotabato, Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat, South Cotabato, Sarangani, Davao del Sur, Lanao
del Norte, Lanao del Sur, and Palawan and the cities of Cotabato,
Dapitan, Dipolog, Pagadian, Zamboanga..Marawi, Iligan, General
Santos, and Puerto Princesa.
-
Establishment of Southern Philippines Council for Peace and
Development (SPCPD) which will have the following powers in
SZOPAD:
1. Exercise control and supervision over appropriate agencies
engaged in peace and development activities in the area;
2.
Monitor, promote, and coordinate development efforts;
3.
Attract foreign investment;
4.
Cause the implementation of peace and development projects;
5.
To be deputized by the Commission on Elections to assist in the
preparation of the holding of elections, referenda or plebiscite
and people's initiative
-
Creation of the Darul Iftah (Advisory Council);
-
Establishment of the Consultative Assembly having powers, among
others, to make rules and regulations to the extent necessary
for the effective and efficient administration of the affairs of
the area.
-
Channeling of public and private investment into the area to
spur economic development
-
Integration of 5,750 members of the MNLF into the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and the joining of 1,500 MNLF elements with
the Philippine National Police;
-
Legislative Enactment to incorporate all the pertinent
provisions of the 1996 Peace Agreement by amending Republic Act
6734 otherwise known as the Organic Act of the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao
-
Conduct of plebiscite
B.
Phase II
Establishment of Genuine Autonomous Government:
Powers:
1.
The New Autonomous Government exercises broad powers in the area
except on Foreign Affairs, National Defense and Security, Postal
Service, Coinage, Fiscal and Monetary Policies, Administration
of Justice except Shari'a, Quarantine, Customs and Tariff,
Citizenship, Naturalization, Immigration, Deportation, General
Auditing, Civil Service and Elections, Foreign Trade, Patents,
Trademarks, Trade-names and Copyrights.
2. The Autonomous
Framework consists of the following:
-
Executive Council, Legislative Assembly, Administrative,
Administrative System and Right of Representation in the
National Government (paragraphs 21-72 PA);
-
The
Establishment of the Special Regional Security Forces for the
Autonomous Region (Phase-2 of the Implementation of the Tripoli
Agreement) (paragraphs 73-93 PA);
-
Educational System to develop total spiritual, intellectual,
social, cultural, scientific and physical aspects of Bangsamoro
people to make them God-fearing, productive, patriotic citizens
conscious of their Filipino and Islamic values and Islamic
cultural heritage (paragraphs 94-124 PA);
-
The
Economic and Financial System, Control over Mines and Minerals
(paragraphs 126-151, PA);
-
Shari'ah (152 PA)
V.
What Happened---
1.
Peace and Development
-
Lost in the euphoria of the new found peace, nobody noticed that
in implementing Executive Order No. 371 signed in October
1996 the stipulated control, and/or regulatory powers of the SPCPD was not provided.
-
Before the ink used in signing the agreement ever dried out so
to speak the GRP immediately held peace talks with the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front without any participation and knowledge
of the SPCPD ignoring the vital role of the latter to
orchestrate the peace and development projects in SZOPAD which
smacks of the divide and rule tactics by the GRP to further
widen the gap between the MNLF and MILF.
-
In
the 1998 general elections, the local elections and plebiscite
in 2000 the SPCPD was not deputized to participate in the
conduct of these electoral exercises violating the agreement
that the SPCPD would be deputized by the COMELEC in the conduct
of any electoral activity in SZOPAD.
-
The
deteriorating peace and order condition in the area, the all out
war policy of the GRP particularly in the Estrada regime, and
the unabated criminal activities of lawless elements such as the
Abu Sayaf, the sidelining by the GRP of the SPCPD in the
resolutions of these conflicts, have all conspired to
marginalize and render the SPCPD irrelevant.
-
All
of the foregoing was aggravated by the "business as usual"
attitude of the government in the preparations and enactment of
the General Appropriation Acts from 1997 to 2001 resulting in
the insufficient funding for the projects intended for
rehabilitation and reconstruction, reconciliation, social,
economic and infrastructure projects.
-
The projects
implemented and the funds released in the SZOPAD during the 3
year transitory period amounting to more or less 30 billion
pesos per government claim, were regular funds for regular
projects and programs (to be implemented even if there was no
Peace Agreement). Moreover, in areas covering 12 provinces and 9
cities, outside the ARMM, the projects and fund utilization were
absolutely under the control and supervision by the appropriate
national government agencies and not the SPCPD.
2. Security
The
integration of 5,750 MNLF members into the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the joining of the MNLF elements with the
Philippine National Police (PNP) is an unprecedented
remobilization and conversion of anti government forces remolded
to serve national interest. MNLF Integrees found themselves in
combat duties against the MILF Mujahidin in the GRP's all out
war during the Estrada Administration. To most of the MNLF
Integrees it was terribly wrong to be used to fight a
fratricidal war against the MILF Mujahideen.
3. Republic
Act 9054
Questioned
Legitimacy
The
passage of Republic Act 9054 otherwise known as “An Act to
Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao, Amending For the Purpose Republic Act 6734,
Entitled An Act Providing For the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao" was vehemently objected by the MNLF as an "arbitrary
and unilateral act of the GRP". There are at least ten
provisions in RA 9054 that need amendment to comply with the
letter and spirit of the 1996 PA. A series of lobbying with the
OIC and demands for the GRP for the convening of a trilateral
committee to act as oversight body to review the pending bills
in Congress in order to harmonize them with the 1996 PA all
failed. During the critical stages of the deliberations in
Congress and the Senate, the Philippines was glued to the
impeachment proceedings of former. President Estrada. And just
as when the Senators and Congressmen in the Bicameral Conference
were exasperated in the impeachment trial and when they "had no
energy left", they deliberated the fate of Mindanao and the
Bangsamoro people and approved Republic Act 9054 in that
Bicameral Conference held on that fateful evening in December
2000, past 11 P.M. in a Conference Room at the Senate when
nobody was looking.
The political
convulsion arising from the impeachment trial and ouster of
former President Estrada left the passage of the questionable
law unnoticed. The MNLF objections drowned in the tumultuous
event in "EDSA II" and the euphoric subsequent events.
4. The Plebiscite
With the
assumption to power by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, the
MNLF was hopeful that RA 9054 would be rectified. But almost
simultaneous with the rise to power of the present
administration, the MNLF leadership was rocked with divisiveness
and obscured any opposition to the new law. Notwithstanding the
internal problem, all MNLF sides officially objected to the
holding of the plebiscite. Despite the opposition, the
plebiscite was held on August 14, 2001 where only 5 provinces
and 1 city voted for inclusion in the ARMM and ratified RA 9054
and these are the provinces of Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Basilan,
Maguindanao, and Lanao del Sur and the city of Marawi.
The clusters of
municipalities in Lanao del Norte, North Cotabato and Sultan
Kudarat that voted for inclusion in the ARMM were left out
since their situation was not in the contemplation of RA 9054.
It must be emphasized that paragraph 2(b) of the FPA provides
that clusters of contiguous Muslim dominated municipalities
voting in favor of autonomy be merged and constituted into new
province(s) which shall become part of the new Autonomous
Region.
VI.
The Imperatives
1. The
United Nations Multi Donor Program (UNMDP)
Second
Assessment Mission Report
The
Second Assessment Mission Report of the UNMDP cites six (6)
risks among others, that could negatively effect the viability
of the 1996 Peace Agreement. They are the following:
a)
An Organic Act that does NOT offer Meaningful Autonomy;
b)
Absolute or relative defeat in the plebiscite on the New ARMM;
c)
An ineffective new autonomous government;
d)
Insufficient government investment;
e)
Lack of citizen ownership;
f)
Spirals of violence by the hawks on both sides that lead to
anarchical situations.
2.
The Executive Doables
2.1.
Right of Representation
This
calls for the immediate implementation of Paragraphs 63 to 71 of
the Peace Agreement which requires the appointment of qualified
Bangsamoro representatives to the following positions in the
government:
-
At least one
member of the Cabinet
-
Board of Directors
in government-owned and controlled corporations operating mainly
or through a subsidiary in the area of autonomy
-
At least one (1)
official in each of all the departments and constitutional
bodies---executive, primarily confidential and highly technical
or policy determining positions;
-
At least one (1)
Justice in the Supreme Court and at least 2 Justices in the
Court of Appeals
-
A member of the
Judicial and Bar Council
2.2
Grievance Machinery
A
grievance machinery like the Joint Monitoring Committee {First
Phase) must be put in place to act as an oversight body to
address the unresolved issues in the MNLF-GRP peace process. It
must be composed of representatives from the MNLF, GRP, and OIC.
Representatives from the Donor Countries and Civil Society must
be provided some participation in the grievance machinery to
infuse dynamism and active participation of all the stakeholders
in the full implementation of the covenants. This mechanism will
provide the necessary conflict preventive measures on conflict
prone issues between the parties.
Bearing in mind
that the 1996 Agreement is only one step, peace building efforts
must be pursued in order for peace to continue and be respected,
2.3 Infuse
Sufficient Private and Public Investment for the NEW ARMM
The
territories comprising ARMM constitute Mindanao's most troubled
1and traumatized by the recurrence of war and government's
neglect and apathy. Up to the present the annual budget of ARMM
have remained dismal and the lowest in the country -- 4.9
billion pesos in 2001; 5.4 billion pesos in 2002 and 5.5 billion
pesos in 2003. For fiscal year 2004, Gov. Parouk S. Hussin
proposed a 14 billion pesos annual budget. The ARMM needs a shot
in the arm so to speak. The President must therefore direct the
DBM and other governmen1 agencies to rechannel some funds to the
ARMM for fiscal year 2005 onwards.
Interventions of
Donor Countries add internationality to the peace process and
contribute greatly to peace building and confidence building
owing to the Bangsamoro educative experience of belongingness to
the community of nations transcending race and religion.
2.4
Strengthening Governance
The
expanded ARMM, owing to its infancy, inherent disabilities,
systemic defects and questionable legitimacy needs all the help
from major actors and stakeholders. Multiple but coherent
strategic approaches may be made accessible to the ARMM such as,
but not limited to:
-
Building confidence between all parties;
-
Recognize and address high expectations raised by the 1996
PA-"better 1ate than never"
-
Dialogues with all parties---local government units including
civil society on contentious issues;
-
Overcome national institutional and political resistance to
autonomy;
-
Ensuring better coordination with appropriate private and
national governmental agencies
-
Ensure better coordination of coherent regional and national
policies for sustainable fiscal sustainability of the autonomous
region through fiscal reforms aimed at increasing regional
revenues. Example: Providing for block grant in accordance with
Section 11, Article XVIII of RA9054.
-
Development of technical and administrative capacity of in place
the ARMM.
-
Immediate establishment of the Human Rights Commission
-
Enhance legislation on Shari' a.
-
Coherent intervention of national line agencies.
-
And
others.
2.5
Implement the Special Regional Security Force
-
Re-assign MNLF AFP integrees in the NEW ARMM territory or at
least in the fon1ler SZOPAD areas-- they shall compose the
Regional defense and Security provided under Section 11, Article
XIII, RA 9054;
-
Full implementation of the Regional Security provisions under
sections 1-10, Article XIII, RA 9054 and re-assign all MNLF-PNP
elements within the ARMM territories or adjacent SZOPAD areas.
3.
Legislative and Constitutional Reforms
Inclusion of
Pertinent Provisions of 1996 PA
On
RA 9054
Assuming
that a multilateral consensus is reached between and among the
parties in the grievance mechanism resolving issues on RA 9054,
then legislative process must be initiated to comply with the
High Contracting Parties' covenant that the autonomy law shall
incorporate all the pertinent provisions of the 1996 PA
consistent with the Bangsamoro peoples' aspiration for self
determination. Among others, the amendments will be the
following:
-
Inclusion in the Expanded ARMM cluster of contiguous Muslim
dominated municipalities opting to join the autonomous region;
-
Regional power over all natural resources in the area 'of
autonomy except strategic minerals to be mutually identified by
the MNLF and the GRP;
-
Compulsory appointment of Qualified Bangsamoro representatives
in accordance with the right of representation provided in the
FA;
-
Amendment of RA 9054 provisions that contravene the FA;
On
Charter Change
Constitutional
Reform must incorporate the highest form of Bangsamoro
aspiration for self determination. The constitutional/legal
arrangement in Hongkong (China), Quebec (Canada), Basque (Spain),and
Federal States in India, Malaysia, Germany, United States of
America and others may serve as models to effectively address
the right of the Bangsamoro nations to self-rule.
VII.
Strengthening the 1996 Peace Agreement
The
strength of the 1996 PA lies in its being a Binding
International Commitment and Obligation (BICO) to implement the
1976 Tripoli Agreement. Historically, the FPA is just one step
in the Bangsamoro people's search for self determination. The
peoples' peace process must continue. The following are
suggested, from among a wide range of opportunities, as
essential elements to keep the banner of peace fly high in
Southern Philippines:
-
Recognize the
infirmities in the implementation of the PA;
-
Amendment of the
questionable provisions of RA 9054;
-
Active
participation of civil society groups of all types;
-
The ARMM, GRP and Donors must provide space/opportunities for the
engagement of these civil society groups;
-
Grievance
machinery to address conflict resolutions;
-
Build capacity of
people, and organizations promoting/defending human rights;
-
Empowerment of
communities to strengthen capacity to initiate peace building
activities even in the height of conflict;
-
Provide
opportunities for international dialogues;
-
Democracy
building-- among others, support to local and regional political
parties.
-
Create climate for
reconciliation and a sustainable reconciliation process based on
justice, recognition of rights of internally displaced
individuals, traditional and customary mechanisms and removal of
roots of conflict.
-
RELEASE OF H.E. CHAIRMAN NUR MISUARI
-
Convene the Tripartite Meeting (GRP-OIC-MNLF) to assess the 1996
Peace Agreement.
