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Bangsamoro Republik

Moro National Liberation Front

Office of the Secretary General

for Foreign Relations

CENTRAL COMMITTEE

 

(Revised Report)

 

Current Situation

in the Bangsamoro Homeland &

Update On The Status

of the MNLF-OIC-GRP Peace Agreement

 

 

Background

The lost of almost 80 percent of ancestral land national homeland or territory and political birth right for independence, not to mention the loss of more than 200,000 precious lives of innocent hapless civilians and uprooting of a million people from their. homeland for an uncertain autonomy is not an ordinary sacrifice in the kaleidoscope of history of mankind.

Unbelievably, above occurred on the. Bangsamoro people. It happened when the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) being the sole and legitimate representative of the Bangsamoro people with the active participation of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), fell to the trap of the official commitment of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) to grant the Bangsamoro people genuine and meaningful political autonomy as contained and provided for in the two (2) successive agreements; the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and the so called 1996 Final Peace Agreement

The unthinkability of this act can still be further emphasized when the facts are taken into account that the Moros were dragged into it when they almost secured victory, as the tide of war was turning already in their favor at the time when the Tripoli Agreement was signed thirty years ago and after making, great sacrifices — loss of hundreds of thousands of lives, destruction to properties, nearly a million rendered homeless and refugees.

Almost thirty years after the signing of the Tripoli Agreement in 1976, and a decade after the signing of the Peace Agreement of 1996, the GRP has not satisfactorily and fully implemented her international binding commitments. Based on GRP's latest report to the OIC, the GRP cannot and does not categorically claim full implementation of the same. (See Annex-A, par.3, p.1).

It is the belief of the MNLF, and hopefully the OIC and other stakeholders share this belief, that, had the PA1996 been satisfactorily and fully implemented there would have been relative peace and development in war-ravaged Mindanao. A cursory glance at the government prepared statistics, without booking the stark reality obtaining in the ground,

reveals that the five (5) provinces of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao are still the most depressed and poorest provinces in the entire country. All economic indicators and all human resource development index like literacy rate, mortality rate, and life expectancy point to the same fact. The PA1996 has not made, therefore, any improvement and impact in the socio-economic life of the Bangsamoro people. It is as if that no peace agreement took place and happened at all.

 

 The Current Situation & The Status of the Final Peace Agreement: Ten Years After its Signing

As we wrote this report, renewed armed violence and hostilities initiated by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) against the soldiers of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) are flaring up in the Bangsamoro Homeland, particularly in its southern part, the Sulu region. This has been fiercely raging without let up days starting Wednesday, April 11, 2007. In the pretext, as always of running after the Abu Sayyaf Group, and to cozy up to the world the Philippines' fight against terrorism, these Filipino troops attacked the MNLF Main Headquarter in Marang, Buansa,Municipality of Indanan,Sulu, South of Philippines.

Prior to this attack, the AFP has made previous. attack on the same place on February 25, 2007, where the AFP incurred six casualties and sixteen injured. The AFP also had mercilessly massacred a- minor child aged 14 in Sitio Panglima Mammah, Indanan, Sulu, a few kilometers away from the MNLF Main Headquarter in Marang. In January 18, 2007, the AFP had also massacred nine (9) Moros in Sitio Tandu-Batu, Barangay Timpook, Patikul, Sulu.

Marang Complex is where Cmdr. Khaid Ajibun, the Chairman of the Lupah Sug (SULU) State Revolutionary Committee of the MNLF, holding his office. As a State Revolutionary Chairman in that area, he, together with other military commanders in the ground defended the integrity of our great Homeland and lives of our Bangsa Moro people and our nation.

Today, Chairman Khaid Ajibun and Ustaz Khabier Malik, the chief commander of the MNLF Task Force Jabal Uhud, under the jurisdiction of the State Command of Chairman Agibon, are being identified by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as their targets of hot pursuit and massive air, land and sea operations. And with an additional One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) bounty for the head of the latter.

With 8,000 Filipino troops, to include the Army, Scout Rangers, Philippine National Police and Marines already in the ground, Malacanang announced that another four (4) battalions of reinforcements would be airlifted to Sulu. No less than the highest official of the land who. spoke of crushing to pieces the MNLF. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has ordered the AFP to go after the group of Malik, and crush them said GRP official and media report.

Aside from AFP chief of staff General Hermogenes Esperon, Jr, who had been ordered by his Commander-in-Chief President Arroyo to go after the MNLF, a coterie of high ranking hawkish generals of the military establishment are also assembled to tactically direct their operations. This includes Lt. Gen. Eugenio Cedo, the chief of the Western Mindanao Command (WesMinCom), Maj. Gen. Ruben Rafael, chief of Task Force Comet and Brig. Gen. Ruperto Pabusan, chief of the AFP Joint Special Operations Task Force in Sulu.

National dailies in the country report that the AFP had been dropping 250 lbs. bombs and fired rockets in Camp Bitanag, in Panamao,, the Headquarters of Ustaz Khabier Malik and lately, as of April 25, 2007, pulverized the MNLF Headquarters of Khaid Ajibon said General Hermogenes Esperon, Jr.

Reports of casualties, though conflicting, are soaring. The MNLF, up to this date, suffered 17 martyrs and27 others injured. As to the AFP, even in their camp in Tayungan, Panamao alone, more than thirty were reported dead, and more than fifty others wounded, contrary to what their AFP spokesman said. And at dawn of Sunday, April 15, three (3) six-by-six trucks loaded with AFP troopers belonging to Marines were wiped out by,the MNLF. In' short, the casualties of the AFP and the marines are rating to 10x to that of the MNLF.

After six days of intense fighting, it's the civilians, of course the populace, who suffer most. Report from the local Department of Social Welfare and Development office in downtown Jolo, put the, displaced persons at 70,000. All these fled from the six affected municipalities -Panamao, Luuk, Kalinggalan Kaluang, Talipao, Indanan, and Parang.

The Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), His Excellency Prof. Ikmeliddin Ihsanoglu appealed to the GRP for a cease-fire repeatedly - on April 11,15 and 17, 2007 - and also the Special Adviser to the OIC Secretary General Ambassador Seyyid Kassem Al-Masry on April 24, 2007 but the GRP, in a language devoid of diplomatic decorum, has flatly rejected the appeals.

The resumption of recent hostilities is attributable to the treacherous machination and scenario-making of AFP generals in order create justification for their destructive design for the MNLF and Bangsa Moro people. One good example of this is the kidnapping and the heinous beheading of the seven (7) workers of the Sulu Governor Benjamin Loong by the suspected Abu Sayyaf on April 19, 2007. The AFP initially attributed the beheading to Ustaz Habier Malik, but the people could not believe this blatant lie or attribution since the site of the beheading, West of Sulu, is far away from the location of Ustaz Habier Malik which is East of Sulu. Then the AFP cooked another lie by attributing the same incident to Khaid Ajibon. The fact of the matter is that it is the AFP in collusion with the Abu Sayyaf that instigated the heinous incident. The whole scenario is a tactic of the AFP to implicate and link the MNLF to terrorism.

Unfortunate series of event like this continually recurring since the beginning of the new millennium graphically illustrates the ugly facade of the Final Peace Agreement. Defaced almost beyond recognition, it is easily quantifiable for the fatal violations it suffers at the hands of the Manila government rather than its spiritless implementation and faithful observance. Their litany of major violations has been endless, year-end and year-out.

To cite some of them:

    1. Unprovoked attack of AFP elements on MNLF Main Headquarter in Marang, Buansa, Indanan, Sulu this April 11, 2007

    2. Beating and detention of 6 MNLF members in Parang,. Sulu by AFP elements in January 2007.

    3. Killing by the AFP Marine Battalion Landing Team of four MNLF members, and wounding three others in Timpook, Patikul on January 18, 2007.

    4. Killing by APF troopers manning a checkpoint of another 5 MNLF members aboard a tamaraw vehicle, also in Patikul the same day.

    5. Straffing by Marine elements of the AFP of Lambayong Mosque, in Duhul Bato, Maubuh, Patikul, and wounding 20 Muslims coming out from the mosque on January 28, 2006.

    6. The highly publicized massacre of the Padiwan Family by elements of the 53rd Infantry Battalion (IB) of the Philippine Army under Col. Dennis Villanueva in Kapuk Punggul, Baunuh Ice, Maimbung, Sulu on February 1, 2005. Four Padiwan family members died on the spot and two others were injured.

    7. The killing of Arasad Asmad, an MNLF civilian, 'and raiding of his community Barangay Laum Suwah, Parang, Sulu by Elite Scout Rangers of the Philippine Army on July 7, 2001. This was during a wedding celebration.

    8. Ambush and raiding of MNLF forces in two MNLF camps --Camp Maharlika in Matikang, Lantawan, -Basilan by the 10th Infantry Battalion of the -Philippine Army under Major Ordonez on June 24 and 26, 2001, and of Camp Masola in the same municipality. Nine MNLF followers of Cmdr. Ustaz Bashir Jailani were killed and 7 others were wounded. Cmdr. Ustaz Bashsir Jailani is the Commanding General of the MNLF National Security Command (NASCOM) and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Bangsamoro Armed Forces

    9. The barbaric assassination in broad daylight of the innocent and unarmed MNLF leader of Subanun tribe in Dipolog City in North Zamboanga Imam Teodoro Thelmo, on April 21, 2007 by the elements of the AFP.

Public Acknowledgement:

President Arroyo Reveals Her Government's Inaction

In February this year just after the crisis situation emanating from the controversial "extended visit" of Marine Brig. Gen. Benjamin Dolorfino, the chief of the Metro Manila National Capital Region Command of the AFP, OPAPP deputy chief Ramon Santos, four colonels and. fifteen others to the Camp Jabal Uhud in Panamao, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo acknowledged that there are still deficiencies, provisions and strands of the Peace Treaty that need to be fast-tracked. Through her Presidential Spokesman, Secretary Ignacio Bunye, the president said that they are committed to fully implement the accord, and had instructed her line agencies to do all the "doables."

Bunye said: "We acknowledge that there are outstanding issues with the MNLF that need to be! resolved under the principles of continuity and comprehensiveness of the peace process; and all departments and agencies are prepared to do their share to make peace work for the greater interest of the nation."

Curing the Peace Agreement:

Essential Fibers and Provisions that Critically Need Assessment

The MNLF has been open in voicing out its persistent calls that the Peace Agreement needs to be revisited, assessed, and evaluated for it to be acceptable to all the stakeholders, especially the MNLF and the Bangsamoro people. And that the legitimate authorities, the high contracting parties to the treaty, such as the MNLF, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, together as a Tripartite body, must once again sit down and talk.

The schedule for this Tripartite Meeting to be held in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been postponed .since July last year for around seven (7) times. During the one-week OIC High Level Fact-finding Mission to the Philippines last May 17-24, 2006, Ambassador Seyyid Kassem Al-Masry, the Head of the Mission, told the parties to the agreement of the July schedule of the Tripartite. He came back to Manila this March 7-9, of this year, and had arranged that the meeting is reset to second week of July 2007. That is after the national elections in the country. And that the goal of the meeting, among others, would be: "The Review of the Implementation of the 1996 Peace Agreement between the GRP and the MNLF; Assessment of Progress Thereon, and identification of Obstacles to the Fall Implementation of the Peace Agreement."

To the MNLF leadership. under the chairmanship of His Excellency Prof. Nur Misuari, the Tripartite Meeting, critically necessary as it is, has been long overdue. The last Tripartite meeting among signatory parties to the Peace Agreement was held at the Indonesian Embassy in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines almost eight years ago, to be exact, on October 1, 1999.

Our leader, H.E. Chairman Nur Misuari has consistently voiced out his concern for the high parties to talk so that peace, a genuine, lasting and comprehensive one, can be ensured. In Davao City last September 2, 2006, when he was granted by the Makati Court few hours travel furlough from his House detention to attend the Manila government-sponsored 10th anniversary celebration of the Peace Agreement, he told the assembly that there is a need to "exhume" the agreement.

Today, in the midst of fighting and exchanges of gunfire between our Mujahedin soldiers and that of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and despite the rejection of the Philippine government and its military authorities of the OIC Secretary General's calls for cessation of hostilities, the more the need for the assessment of the Peace Agreement is becoming necessary. We maintain, as in the past, that the essential substance in letters and spirit rit of the accord remain to be implemented. And such implementation must be multilateral, meaning, not just the Manila government to do it. But it must, as a rule, include the MNLF and the OIC as its peace-making, peace-building and developmental partners.

 

Updates on the Bone of Contention of Implementation:

The Essential Substance and Spirit of the Agreement

    1. In Phase I, which was from 1996 to 1999, this has never been satisfactorily completed.

    2. In Phase II, the vital political, military and economic components of the Peace Agreement were either undermined or deliberately unsustained.

    3. R.A. 9054 is not the replica of the Final Peace Agreement.

    4. Integration of MNLF forces to the AFP, scattered as, they are in different military units and provinces of the country, run counter to their mandate of maintaining peace and security of the Muslim region. Instead they are used to fight their fellow Muslim brothers.

    5. The legal structures and administrative mechanism of the, autonomous government are not in the hands of the MNLF. Instead of treating us as peace partners in the overall affairs of region-building, the policy agenda of Malacanang is to marginalize and cast away the MNLF people from active participation and involvement in the regional governing system and in manning their people's affairs.

    6. The much talk-about Mini-Marshall Plan for massive reconstruction and development of the war-ravaged South Philippines remain a dream. Only Malacanang knows why.

Additionally, as could be gleaned below, here lies the deficiencies, loopholes and inequities.

The 5-Basic Elements of Phase II:

Phase II-A: Executive Council, Legislative Assembly, Administrative Systems and, Representation in the National Government. (Paragraph 2172 PA)

Phase II-B: Special Regional Security Force. (Paragraph 73-93 PA)

Phase II-C: Education. (Paragraph 21-72 PA)

Phase II-D: Economics and Financial Systems, Mines and Minerals. (Paragraph 94-151)

Phase II-E: Shari-ah and Judiciary. (Paragraph 152 PA)

    1. On the Territory: The bone of contention on Phase II-A is with respect to the determination of the areas to be included under, the supposed New Autonomous Government. The GRP insisted with the plebiscite despite the objection of the MNLF.

    2. The MNLF did not recognize the Plebiscite unilaterally conducted by the GRP on August 20, 2001.

    3. For refusing to accept the said plebiscite, the GRP provoked and attacked the MNLF forces and finally arrested and illegally detained H.E. Chairman Nur Misuari.

    4. The MNLF maintains that plebiscite is violative of the Tripoli Agreement, Paragraph 8, Article II, which specifically enumerates the areas to be included under the New Autonomous Government.

    5. On the question on National Representation: The GRP has not made any single appointment pursuant to Paragraph 65 PA and to R.A.9054, Article V, Sec. 2 where it provides that appointment should be through the recommendation of the Regional Governor.

    6. The same provision R.A. 9054, Article V, Sec. 2 emasculates the power of the Regional Governor through the insertion of the phrase "in consultation with the elected officials and the concerned sectors of the autonomous region". This is digression if not a violation of Paragraphs 63 and 66 of the Peace Agreement.

    7. All the appointments so far made by the GRP fall within Paragraph 64 PA and R.A 9054, Article V, Sec.4, which are optional appointment or appointment deemed not within the ambit of the Agreement.

    8. Those Moros already appointed to government positions are either belonging to the Administration political party or career servants. In some instances, the GRP sees to it that those Moros should be anti-Moros or at least subservient to the government..

    9. On the issue of Special Regional Security Forces (SRSF) : The second sentence of Paragraph 8, Article III' of the Tripoli Agreement -- "toe relationship between these forces and the Central security forces...", provides for the separate framework for the Regional Security forces and.-the Central security forces. The rationale behind this is to put in place, in the Autonomous Government, security forces not hostile to the inhabitants. The, Special Regional Security Forces created under Article XIII, R.A.9054, though bearing this nomenclature, because its composition, organization and chain of command are essentially the same Central security forces.

    10. Subparagraphs b and c No.20 of the Peace Agreement provides that initially the MNLF' forces will be "organized into separate units within the transition period" under a Deputy Commander of the Southern Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines.

    11. In violations of the Peace Agreement, the GRP did not organize the MNLF integrees into separate units under the command of the Deputy Commander. The worst part of it is that the GRP deployed, and continues to deploy, the MNLF integrees in combat duties to fight Muslim brothers in the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and even against the MNLF!

    12. The insertion of the phrase "may be deployed in the autonomous region or elsewhere in the Republic" in Article XIII, Sec.3, betrays the purpose of the establishment of the Special Regional Security Force which is a security force tasked with the preservation of peace, maintenance of law and order and protection of life, liberty and property in the autonomous region. The insertion made by the GRP gives rise .to the situation, as it is now, where the MNLF elements in the SRSF are being deployed any area in the Philippines which is repugnant to the letter and spirit of the 1996 PA and more particularly Paragraph 8, Article III of the Tripoli Agreement.

    13. On Economic and Financial Systems, Mines and Minerals: In order to survive as a viable Autonomous Government, there must be some degree of control over the exploration,utilization, development of the natural resources.

    14. R.A.9054, Article X, Sec.1 and Article XII, Sec.5 violates Paragraphs 146 and 147 1996 PA.

    15. The GRP, acting through Congress has unilaterally, arbitrarily and unconscionably arrogated to itself the power to define strategic mines and minerals violating Paragraphs 146 and 147 of 1996 PA. This negates the agreement which requires that the MNLF and nd the GRP with the positive of the technical experts of the OIC will mutually agree on the definition of the strategic mines and minerals on a latter date.

    16. This is a gross violation of the Agreement because it strikes into the heart of the jurisdiction of the Autonomous Government over Mines and Minerals with in its territory. The worst of all, the areas where there are mines and minerals were removed thru the fake plebiscite.

    17. It is well to mention that in the course of the negotiation during the peace talks, the definition of the strategic minerals as proposed by the GRP such as what is now provided under Article X, Sec. was rejected by the MNLF panel. A definition by gestation was the counterproposal of the MNLF panel, hence the disagreement. As a consequence, the MNLF and the GRP agreed to define the strategic minerals later as provided for in Paragraph * 146 PA Any attempt therefore to define strategic minerals unilaterally is unacceptable as it violates the Agreement. The intent was to come up with a tripartite expert definition and the same must be done before the crafting of the amendatory bills.

    18. Article X, Sec. definition of the ancestral domain will rob the inhabitants in the autonomous region of their birthright over the God given, natural resources which by law protected and strengthened by R.A.8371. It must be born in mind that one of the issue that drove the Bangsamoro people to take up arms and assert their birth right to determination is the land grabbing issue. The GRP has once again committed a disservice to the cause of peace by removing strategic minerals such as uranium coal, petroleum, and other fossil fuels, mineral oil, and all sources of potential energy; lakes, river, and lagoons; and national reserves and marine parks, as well as forest and watershed reservation from the scope of the ancestral domain and the jurisdiction of the autonomous region. This is contrary to the provisions of R.A. 8371 known as Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) which provides under Sec.3 thereof that ancestral domains refer to all areas generally belonging to the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs), Indigenous People (IPs), comprising lands, inland waters, coastal water, and natural resources therein which necessary to ensure their economic, social, and cultural welfare which include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, minerals and other natural resources.

    19. Based on the foregoing, the GRP does not only want to make the Bangsamoro surrender their right to self determination but also want to perpetuate economic depravity by continually depriving them of their God-given natural resources. Concomitantly, of the approximately more than 117,000 km2 of the original areas of the Bangsamoro, only 68,000 km2 is included in the Tripoli Agreement and subsequently, after the fake referendum on August 10, 2001, only 12,000 km2 is left. A whooping more than 90% of the land areas of the Bangsamoro is lost in the course of peace-making process.

    20. The questioned provisions negate the letter and the spirit of the Paragraph 27 1996 PA which grants plenary legislative power to the Legislative Assembly to pass laws on all matters, concerns and issues with in the area of the autonomy except those specified under the Tripoli Agreement.

Impediments to the Implementation of the 1996 PA:

  • The MNLF stands steadfast on its official policy that any piece of legislation or executive fiat by the GRP will only be acceptable if it is consistent with both the letter and spirit of the Tripoli Agreement as well as the Peace Agreement of September 02, 1996.

  • R.A. 9054 ( an act to strengthen and expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous, Region in Muslim Mindanao, amending for the purpose Republic Act 6734 ., entitled "An Act providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as amended) constitutes the greatest stumbling block in the full implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and the 1996 Peace Agreement.

GRP Bid for OIC Observer Status:

After spilling the blood of more than 200,000 lives of the Bangsamoro people, desecrating and tinkering with the Tripoli Agreement, the GRP has the temerity to apply for OIC observer status.

The MNLF recognizes that the OIC has the sole prerogative in the matter of the admission of any organization and state to its fold. But the application and the subsequent admission of the GRP as an OIC observer status has an adverse consequence to the MNLF and the Bangsamoro people for the following reasons:

    1. It will run in conflict with the status of the MNLF as the sole and legitimate representative of the Bangsamoro people to the OIC.

    2. The GRP cannot represent the aspiration of the Bangsamoro people religiously, culturally, politically and economically.

    3. The MNLF has been representing the entire 20 Million Bangsamoro people for many years, and there is no complaint whatsoever coming from any group of Bangsamoro people whether Muslim, Christian and Lumad or Highlander to such MNLF representation.

    4. The ARMM with only two million populations cannot represent the 20 Million Bangsamoro people.

    5. The representation of the GRP in the OIC could undermine the advancement of the MNLF and the Bangsamoro people aspiration before the OIC.

    6. The representation of the MNLF in the OIC guarantees the continuous survival of the Bangsamoro people as an integral part of the Islamic Ummah.

    7. To admit the GRP to the fold of OIC is unjust to the more than 200,000 innocent Muslims massacred by the Philippine Government through her armed forces, police and militia since 1968 up to the present.

    8. To grant GRP observer status in the OIC is to reward the former for violating vital provisions of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and 1996 Agreement.

    9. A nation like the Philippines that takes pride of its crucial split vote in the U.N General Assembly in the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 (from the heartland of the Arab Palestine) must not be rewarded with a grant of an observer status in the OIC.

Summary

For the past ten years since September 1996 up to the present, we maintain that substantially the political, military and economic components of the Final Peace Agreement remain to be implemented. And in this implementation, the MNLF and the OIC must be involved—and must be the peace partners.

Recommendations

May we respectfully reiterate our recommendations, which we have submitted previously, to wit:

Expedite the release of the MNLF Chairman His Excellency, Chairman Prof. Nur Misuari;

Immediately convene the Tripartite Meeting among signatory parties to the Peace Agreement, namely, the MNLF, the GRP and the OIC, and with H.E. Chairman Nur Misuari in attendance;

Upgrade the Observer Status of the Bangsamoro being represented by the MNLF at the OIC to full fledged membership;

Condemn the on-going terroristic acts and the violations of the Peace Agreement being perpetrated by the GRP its military hawks against the MNLF, the sole and the legitimate representative of the Bangsamoro People, South Philippines.

Create a Joint Team among the OIC member states to monitor the implementation of the Peace Agreement and the Military Cessation of hostilities.

Kindly initiate and enjoin all other OIC countries for a Fund Drive Humanitarian Assistance Program to the Bangsamoro people through their sole and legitimate representative, the MNLF, consonant with the yearly resolutions of the ICFM and that of the Summits of Muslim Heads of State and government.

 

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