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Bangsamoro Republik
Moro National Liberation Front
Office
of
the Secretary General
for Foreign Relations
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
(Revised Report)
Current Situation
in the Bangsamoro Homeland &
Update On The Status
of the MNLF-OIC-GRP Peace Agreement
Background
The lost of almost
80 percent of ancestral land national homeland
or territory and political birth right for
independence, not to mention the loss of more
than 200,000 precious lives of innocent hapless
civilians and uprooting of a million people from
their. homeland for an uncertain autonomy is not
an ordinary sacrifice in the kaleidoscope of
history of mankind.
Unbelievably, above occurred on the. Bangsamoro
people. It happened when the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF) being the sole and
legitimate representative of the Bangsamoro
people with the active participation of the
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), fell
to the trap of the official commitment of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines
(GRP) to grant the Bangsamoro people genuine and
meaningful political autonomy as contained and
provided for in the two (2) successive
agreements; the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and the
so called 1996 Final Peace Agreement
The
unthinkability of this act can still be further
emphasized when the facts are taken into account
that the Moros were dragged into it when they
almost secured victory, as the tide of war was
turning already in their favor at the time when
the Tripoli Agreement was signed thirty years
ago and after making, great sacrifices — loss of
hundreds of thousands of lives, destruction to
properties, nearly a million rendered homeless
and refugees.
Almost thirty years after the signing of the
Tripoli Agreement in 1976, and a decade after
the signing of the Peace Agreement of 1996, the
GRP has not satisfactorily and fully implemented
her international binding commitments. Based on
GRP's latest report to the OIC, the GRP cannot
and does not categorically claim full
implementation of the same. (See Annex-A, par.3,
p.1).
It
is the belief of the MNLF, and hopefully the OIC
and other stakeholders share this belief, that,
had the PA1996 been satisfactorily and fully
implemented there would have been relative peace
and development in war-ravaged Mindanao. A
cursory glance at the government prepared
statistics, without booking the stark reality
obtaining in the ground,
reveals that the five (5) provinces of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao are still
the most depressed and poorest provinces in the
entire country. All economic indicators and all
human resource development index like literacy
rate, mortality rate, and life expectancy point
to the same fact. The PA1996 has not made,
therefore, any improvement and impact in the
socio-economic life of the Bangsamoro people. It
is as if that no peace agreement took place and
happened at all.
The Current Situation &
The Status of the Final Peace Agreement:
Ten Years After its
Signing
As
we wrote this report, renewed armed violence and
hostilities initiated by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) against the soldiers of the
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) are
flaring up in the Bangsamoro Homeland,
particularly in its southern part, the Sulu
region. This has been fiercely raging without
let up days starting Wednesday, April 11, 2007.
In the pretext, as always of running after the
Abu Sayyaf Group, and to cozy up to the world
the Philippines' fight against terrorism, these
Filipino troops attacked the MNLF Main
Headquarter in Marang, Buansa,Municipality of
Indanan,Sulu, South of Philippines.
Prior to this attack, the
AFP has made previous. attack on the same place
on February 25, 2007, where the AFP incurred six
casualties and sixteen injured. The AFP also had
mercilessly massacred a- minor child aged 14 in
Sitio Panglima Mammah, Indanan,
Sulu,
a few kilometers away from
the MNLF Main Headquarter in Marang. In January
18, 2007, the AFP had also massacred nine (9)
Moros in Sitio Tandu-Batu, Barangay Timpook,
Patikul, Sulu.
Marang Complex is where Cmdr. Khaid Ajibun, the
Chairman of the Lupah Sug (SULU) State
Revolutionary Committee of the MNLF, holding his
office. As a State Revolutionary Chairman in
that area, he, together with other military
commanders in the ground defended the integrity
of our great Homeland and lives of our Bangsa
Moro people and our nation.
Today, Chairman Khaid Ajibun and Ustaz Khabier
Malik, the chief commander of the MNLF Task
Force Jabal Uhud, under the jurisdiction of the
State Command of Chairman Agibon, are being
identified by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines as their targets of hot pursuit and
massive air, land and sea operations. And with
an additional One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00)
bounty for the head of the latter.
With 8,000 Filipino troops, to include the Army,
Scout Rangers, Philippine National Police and
Marines already in the ground, Malacanang
announced that another four (4) battalions of
reinforcements would be airlifted to Sulu. No
less than the highest official of the land who.
spoke of crushing to pieces the MNLF. President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has ordered the AFP to
go after the group of Malik, and crush them said
GRP official and media report.
Aside from AFP chief of staff General
Hermogenes Esperon, Jr, who had been
ordered by his Commander-in-Chief President
Arroyo to go after the MNLF, a coterie of high
ranking hawkish generals of the military
establishment are also assembled to tactically
direct their operations. This includes
Lt. Gen. Eugenio Cedo, the chief of the
Western Mindanao Command (WesMinCom),
Maj. Gen. Ruben Rafael, chief of Task
Force Comet and Brig. Gen. Ruperto
Pabusan, chief of the AFP Joint Special
Operations Task Force in Sulu.
National dailies in the country report that the
AFP had been dropping 250 lbs. bombs
and fired rockets in Camp Bitanag, in
Panamao,, the Headquarters of Ustaz Khabier
Malik and lately, as of April 25, 2007,
pulverized the MNLF Headquarters of Khaid Ajibon
said General Hermogenes Esperon, Jr.
Reports of casualties, though conflicting, are
soaring. The MNLF, up to this date, suffered 17
martyrs and27 others injured. As to the AFP,
even in their camp in Tayungan, Panamao alone,
more than thirty were reported dead, and more
than fifty others wounded, contrary to what
their AFP spokesman said. And at dawn of Sunday,
April 15, three (3) six-by-six trucks loaded
with AFP troopers belonging to Marines were
wiped out by,the MNLF. In' short, the casualties
of the AFP and the marines are rating to 10x to
that of the MNLF.
After six days of intense fighting, it's the
civilians, of course the populace, who suffer
most. Report from the local Department of Social
Welfare and Development office in downtown Jolo,
put the, displaced persons at 70,000.
All these fled from the six affected
municipalities -Panamao, Luuk,
Kalinggalan Kaluang, Talipao, Indanan, and
Parang.
The
Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic
Conference (OIC), His Excellency Prof.
Ikmeliddin Ihsanoglu appealed to the GRP for a
cease-fire repeatedly - on April 11,15 and 17,
2007 - and also the Special Adviser to the OIC
Secretary General Ambassador Seyyid Kassem Al-Masry
on April 24, 2007 but the GRP, in a language
devoid of diplomatic decorum, has flatly
rejected the appeals.
The
resumption of recent hostilities is attributable
to the treacherous machination and
scenario-making of AFP generals in order create
justification for their destructive design for
the MNLF and Bangsa Moro people. One good
example of this is the kidnapping and the
heinous beheading of the seven (7) workers of
the Sulu Governor Benjamin Loong by the
suspected Abu Sayyaf on April 19, 2007. The AFP
initially attributed the beheading to Ustaz
Habier Malik, but the people could not believe
this blatant lie or attribution since the site
of the beheading, West of Sulu, is far away from
the location of Ustaz Habier Malik which is East
of Sulu. Then the AFP cooked another lie by
attributing the same incident to Khaid Ajibon.
The fact of the matter is that it is the AFP in
collusion with the Abu Sayyaf that instigated
the heinous incident. The whole scenario is a
tactic of the AFP to implicate and link the MNLF
to terrorism.
Unfortunate series of event like this
continually recurring since the beginning of the
new millennium graphically illustrates the ugly
facade of the Final Peace Agreement. Defaced
almost beyond recognition, it is easily
quantifiable for the fatal violations it suffers
at the hands of the Manila government rather
than its spiritless implementation and faithful
observance. Their litany of major violations has
been endless, year-end and year-out.
To
cite some of them:
-
Unprovoked
attack of AFP elements on MNLF Main
Headquarter in Marang, Buansa, Indanan,
Sulu this April 11, 2007
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Beating and
detention of 6 MNLF members in Parang,.
Sulu by AFP elements in January 2007.
-
Killing by
the AFP Marine Battalion Landing Team of
four MNLF members, and wounding three
others in Timpook, Patikul on January
18, 2007.
-
Killing by
APF troopers manning a checkpoint of
another 5 MNLF members aboard a tamaraw
vehicle, also in Patikul the same day.
-
Straffing
by Marine elements of the AFP of
Lambayong Mosque, in Duhul Bato, Maubuh,
Patikul, and wounding 20 Muslims coming
out from the mosque on January 28, 2006.
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The highly
publicized massacre of the Padiwan
Family by elements of the 53rd Infantry
Battalion (IB) of the Philippine Army
under Col. Dennis Villanueva in Kapuk
Punggul, Baunuh Ice, Maimbung, Sulu on
February 1, 2005. Four Padiwan family
members died on the spot and two others
were injured.
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The killing
of Arasad Asmad, an MNLF civilian, 'and
raiding of his community Barangay Laum
Suwah, Parang, Sulu by Elite Scout
Rangers of the Philippine Army on July
7, 2001. This was during a wedding
celebration.
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Ambush and
raiding of MNLF forces in two MNLF camps
--Camp Maharlika in Matikang, Lantawan,
-Basilan by the 10th Infantry Battalion
of the -Philippine Army under Major
Ordonez on June 24 and 26, 2001, and of
Camp Masola in the same municipality.
Nine MNLF followers of Cmdr. Ustaz
Bashir Jailani were killed and 7 others
were wounded. Cmdr. Ustaz Bashsir
Jailani is the Commanding General of the
MNLF National Security Command (NASCOM)
and Deputy Chief of Staff of the
Bangsamoro Armed Forces
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The
barbaric assassination in broad daylight
of the innocent and unarmed MNLF leader
of Subanun tribe in Dipolog City in
North Zamboanga Imam Teodoro Thelmo, on
April 21, 2007 by the elements of the
AFP.
Public
Acknowledgement:
President Arroyo Reveals Her Government's
Inaction
In
February this year just after the crisis
situation emanating from the controversial
"extended visit" of Marine Brig. Gen.
Benjamin Dolorfino, the chief of the
Metro Manila National Capital Region Command of
the AFP, OPAPP deputy chief Ramon Santos,
four colonels and. fifteen others to the Camp
Jabal Uhud in Panamao, President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo acknowledged that there are
still deficiencies, provisions and strands of
the Peace Treaty that need to be fast-tracked.
Through her Presidential Spokesman, Secretary
Ignacio Bunye, the president said that they are
committed to fully implement the accord, and had
instructed her line agencies to do all the "doables."
Bunye said: "We acknowledge that there are
outstanding issues with the MNLF that need to
be! resolved under the principles of continuity
and comprehensiveness of the peace process; and
all departments and agencies are prepared to do
their share to make peace work for the greater
interest of the nation."
Curing the
Peace Agreement:
Essential Fibers
and Provisions that Critically Need Assessment
The
MNLF has been open in voicing out its persistent
calls that the Peace Agreement needs to be
revisited, assessed, and evaluated for it to be
acceptable to all the stakeholders, especially
the MNLF and the Bangsamoro people. And that the
legitimate authorities, the high contracting
parties to the treaty, such as the MNLF, the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines
and the Organization of the Islamic Conference,
together as a Tripartite body, must once again
sit down and talk.
The
schedule for this Tripartite Meeting to be held
in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been
postponed .since July last year for around seven
(7) times. During the one-week OIC High Level
Fact-finding Mission to the Philippines last May
17-24, 2006, Ambassador Seyyid Kassem
Al-Masry, the Head of the Mission, told
the parties to the agreement of the July
schedule of the Tripartite. He came back to
Manila this March 7-9, of this year, and had
arranged that the meeting is reset to second
week of July 2007. That is after the national
elections in the country. And that the goal of
the meeting, among others, would be:
"The Review of the Implementation of the
1996 Peace Agreement between the GRP and the
MNLF; Assessment of Progress Thereon, and
identification of Obstacles to the Fall
Implementation of the Peace Agreement."
To
the MNLF leadership. under the
chairmanship of His Excellency Prof. Nur Misuari,
the Tripartite Meeting, critically necessary as
it is, has been long overdue. The last
Tripartite meeting among signatory parties to
the Peace Agreement was held at the Indonesian
Embassy in Makati City, Metro Manila,
Philippines almost eight years ago, to be exact,
on October 1, 1999.
Our
leader, H.E. Chairman Nur Misuari has
consistently voiced out his concern for the high
parties to talk so that peace, a genuine,
lasting and comprehensive one, can be ensured.
In Davao City last September 2, 2006, when he
was granted by the Makati Court few hours travel
furlough from his House detention to attend the
Manila government-sponsored 10th anniversary
celebration of the Peace Agreement, he told the
assembly that there is a need to "exhume" the
agreement.
Today, in the midst of fighting and exchanges of
gunfire between our Mujahedin soldiers and that
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and
despite the rejection of the Philippine
government and its military authorities of the
OIC Secretary General's calls for cessation of
hostilities, the more the need for the
assessment of the Peace Agreement is becoming
necessary. We maintain, as in the past, that
the essential substance in letters and
spirit rit of the accord remain to be
implemented. And such implementation
must be multilateral, meaning, not just the
Manila government to do it. But it must, as a
rule, include the MNLF and the OIC as its
peace-making, peace-building and developmental
partners.
Updates on the Bone
of Contention of Implementation:
The
Essential Substance and Spirit of the Agreement
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In Phase I,
which was from 1996 to 1999, this has
never been satisfactorily completed.
-
In Phase
II, the vital political, military and
economic components of the Peace
Agreement were either undermined or
deliberately unsustained.
-
R.A. 9054
is not the replica of the Final Peace
Agreement.
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Integration
of MNLF forces to the AFP, scattered as,
they are in different military units and
provinces of the country, run counter to
their mandate of maintaining peace and
security of the Muslim region. Instead
they are used to fight their fellow
Muslim brothers.
-
The legal
structures and administrative mechanism
of the, autonomous government are not in
the hands of the MNLF. Instead of
treating us as peace partners in the
overall affairs of region-building, the
policy agenda of Malacanang is to
marginalize and cast away the MNLF
people from active participation and
involvement in the regional governing
system and in manning their people's
affairs.
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The much
talk-about Mini-Marshall Plan
for massive reconstruction and
development of the war-ravaged South
Philippines remain a dream. Only
Malacanang knows why.
Additionally, as could be gleaned below, here
lies the deficiencies, loopholes and inequities.
The
5-Basic Elements of Phase II:
Phase II-A: Executive Council,
Legislative Assembly,
Administrative Systems and,
Representation in the National
Government. (Paragraph 2172 PA)
Phase II-B: Special Regional
Security Force. (Paragraph 73-93
PA)
Phase II-C: Education.
(Paragraph 21-72 PA)
Phase II-D: Economics and
Financial Systems, Mines and
Minerals. (Paragraph 94-151)
Phase II-E: Shari-ah and
Judiciary. (Paragraph 152 PA)
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On the
Territory: The bone of contention on
Phase II-A is with respect to the
determination of the areas to be
included under, the supposed New
Autonomous Government. The GRP insisted
with the plebiscite despite the
objection of the MNLF.
-
The MNLF
did not recognize the Plebiscite
unilaterally conducted by the GRP on
August 20, 2001.
-
For
refusing to accept the said plebiscite,
the GRP provoked and attacked the MNLF
forces and finally arrested and
illegally detained H.E. Chairman Nur
Misuari.
-
The MNLF
maintains that plebiscite is violative
of the Tripoli Agreement, Paragraph 8,
Article II, which specifically
enumerates the areas to be included
under the New Autonomous Government.
-
On the
question on National Representation: The
GRP has not made any single appointment
pursuant to Paragraph 65 PA and to
R.A.9054, Article V, Sec. 2 where it
provides that appointment should be
through the recommendation of the
Regional Governor.
-
The same
provision R.A. 9054, Article V, Sec. 2
emasculates the power of the Regional
Governor through the insertion of the
phrase "in consultation with the elected
officials and the concerned sectors of
the autonomous region". This is
digression if not a violation of
Paragraphs 63 and 66 of the Peace
Agreement.
-
All the
appointments so far made by the GRP fall
within Paragraph 64 PA and R.A 9054,
Article V, Sec.4, which are optional
appointment or appointment deemed not
within the ambit of the Agreement.
-
Those Moros
already appointed to government
positions are either belonging to the
Administration political party or career
servants. In some instances, the GRP
sees to it that those Moros should be
anti-Moros or at least subservient to
the government..
-
On the
issue of Special Regional Security
Forces (SRSF) : The second sentence of
Paragraph 8, Article III' of the Tripoli
Agreement -- "toe relationship between
these forces and the Central security
forces...", provides for the separate
framework for the Regional Security
forces and.-the Central security forces.
The rationale behind this is to put in
place, in the Autonomous Government,
security forces not hostile to the
inhabitants. The, Special Regional
Security Forces created under Article
XIII, R.A.9054, though bearing this
nomenclature, because its composition,
organization and chain of command are
essentially the same Central security
forces.
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Subparagraphs b and c No.20 of the Peace
Agreement provides that initially the
MNLF' forces will be "organized into
separate units within the transition
period" under a Deputy Commander of the
Southern Command, Armed Forces of the
Philippines.
-
In
violations of the Peace Agreement, the
GRP did not organize the MNLF integrees
into separate units under the command of
the Deputy Commander. The worst part of
it is that the GRP deployed, and
continues to deploy, the MNLF integrees
in combat duties to fight Muslim
brothers in the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) and even against the MNLF!
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The
insertion of the phrase "may be deployed
in the autonomous region or elsewhere in
the Republic" in Article XIII, Sec.3,
betrays the purpose of the establishment
of the Special Regional Security Force
which is a security force tasked with
the preservation of peace, maintenance
of law and order and protection of life,
liberty and property in the autonomous
region. The insertion made by the GRP
gives rise .to the situation, as it is
now, where the MNLF elements in the SRSF
are being deployed any area in the
Philippines which is repugnant to the
letter and spirit of the 1996 PA and
more particularly Paragraph 8, Article
III of the Tripoli Agreement.
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On Economic
and Financial Systems, Mines and
Minerals: In order to survive as a
viable Autonomous Government, there must
be some degree of control over the
exploration,utilization, development of
the natural resources.
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R.A.9054,
Article X, Sec.1 and Article XII, Sec.5
violates Paragraphs 146 and 147 1996 PA.
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The GRP,
acting through Congress has
unilaterally, arbitrarily and
unconscionably arrogated to itself the
power to define strategic mines and
minerals violating Paragraphs 146 and
147 of 1996 PA. This negates the
agreement which requires that the MNLF
and nd the GRP with the positive of the
technical experts of the OIC will
mutually agree on the definition of the
strategic mines and minerals on a latter
date.
-
This is a
gross violation of the Agreement because
it strikes into the heart of the
jurisdiction of the Autonomous
Government over Mines and Minerals with
in its territory. The worst of
all, the areas where there are mines and
minerals were removed thru the fake
plebiscite.
-
It is well
to mention that in the course of the
negotiation during the peace talks, the
definition of the strategic minerals as
proposed by the GRP such as what is now
provided under Article X, Sec. was
rejected by the MNLF panel. A definition
by gestation was the counterproposal of
the MNLF panel, hence the disagreement.
As a consequence, the MNLF and the GRP
agreed to define the strategic minerals
later as provided for in Paragraph * 146
PA Any attempt therefore to define
strategic minerals unilaterally is
unacceptable as it violates the
Agreement. The intent was to come up
with a tripartite expert definition and
the same must be done before the
crafting of the amendatory bills.
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Article X,
Sec. definition of the ancestral domain
will rob the inhabitants in the
autonomous region of their birthright
over the God given, natural resources
which by law protected and strengthened
by R.A.8371. It must be born in mind
that one of the issue that drove the
Bangsamoro people to take up arms and
assert their birth right to
determination is the land grabbing
issue. The GRP has once again committed
a disservice to the cause of peace by
removing strategic minerals such as
uranium coal, petroleum, and other
fossil fuels, mineral oil, and all
sources of potential energy; lakes,
river, and lagoons; and national
reserves and marine parks, as well as
forest and watershed reservation from
the scope of the ancestral domain and
the jurisdiction of the autonomous
region. This is contrary to the
provisions of R.A. 8371 known as
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA)
which provides under Sec.3 thereof that
ancestral domains refer to all areas
generally belonging to the Indigenous
Cultural Communities (ICCs), Indigenous
People (IPs), comprising lands, inland
waters, coastal water, and natural
resources therein which necessary to
ensure their economic, social, and
cultural welfare which include ancestral
lands, forests, pasture, residential,
agricultural, and other lands
individually owned whether alienable and
disposable or otherwise, hunting
grounds, burial grounds, worship areas,
bodies of water, minerals and other
natural resources.
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Based on
the foregoing, the GRP does not only
want to make the Bangsamoro surrender
their right to self determination but
also want to perpetuate economic
depravity by continually depriving them
of their God-given natural resources.
Concomitantly, of the approximately more
than 117,000 km2 of the original areas
of the Bangsamoro, only 68,000 km2 is
included in the Tripoli Agreement and
subsequently, after the fake referendum
on August 10, 2001, only 12,000 km2 is
left. A whooping more than 90% of the
land areas of the Bangsamoro is lost in
the course of peace-making process.
-
The
questioned provisions negate the letter
and the spirit of the Paragraph 27 1996
PA which grants plenary legislative
power to the Legislative Assembly to
pass laws on all matters, concerns and
issues with in the area of the autonomy
except those specified under the Tripoli
Agreement.
Impediments to the Implementation of the 1996
PA:
-
The MNLF stands
steadfast on its official policy that any piece
of legislation or executive fiat by the GRP will
only be acceptable if it is consistent with both
the letter and spirit of the Tripoli Agreement
as well as the Peace Agreement of September 02,
1996.
-
R.A. 9054 ( an act to
strengthen and expand the Organic Act for the
Autonomous, Region in Muslim Mindanao, amending for
the purpose Republic Act 6734 ., entitled "An Act
providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, as amended) constitutes the greatest
stumbling block in the full implementation of the
1976 Tripoli Agreement and the 1996 Peace Agreement.
GRP
Bid for OIC Observer Status:
After spilling the blood of more than 200,000
lives of the Bangsamoro people, desecrating and
tinkering with the Tripoli Agreement, the GRP
has the temerity to apply for OIC observer
status.
The
MNLF recognizes that the OIC has the sole
prerogative in the matter of the admission of
any organization and state to its fold. But the
application and the subsequent admission of the
GRP as an OIC observer status has an adverse
consequence to the MNLF and the Bangsamoro
people for the following reasons:
-
It will run
in conflict with the status of the MNLF
as the sole and legitimate
representative of the Bangsamoro people
to the OIC.
-
The GRP
cannot represent the aspiration of the
Bangsamoro people religiously,
culturally, politically and
economically.
-
The MNLF
has been representing the entire 20
Million Bangsamoro people for many
years, and there is no complaint
whatsoever coming from any group of
Bangsamoro people whether Muslim,
Christian and Lumad or Highlander to
such MNLF representation.
-
The ARMM
with only two million populations cannot
represent the 20 Million Bangsamoro
people.
-
The
representation of the GRP in the OIC
could undermine the advancement of the
MNLF and the Bangsamoro people
aspiration before the OIC.
-
The
representation of the MNLF in the OIC
guarantees the continuous survival of
the Bangsamoro people as an integral
part of the Islamic Ummah.
-
To admit
the GRP to the fold of OIC is unjust to
the more than 200,000 innocent Muslims
massacred by the Philippine Government
through her armed forces, police and
militia since 1968 up to the present.
-
To grant
GRP observer status in the OIC is to
reward the former for violating vital
provisions of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement
and 1996 Agreement.
-
A nation
like the Philippines that takes pride of
its crucial split vote in the U.N
General Assembly in the creation of the
State of Israel in 1948 (from the
heartland of the Arab Palestine) must
not be rewarded with a grant of an
observer status in the OIC.
Summary
For
the past ten years since September 1996 up to
the present, we maintain that substantially the
political, military and economic components of
the Final Peace Agreement remain to be
implemented. And in this implementation, the
MNLF and the OIC must be involved—and must be
the peace partners.
Recommendations
May
we respectfully reiterate our recommendations,
which we have submitted previously, to wit:
Expedite the release of the MNLF Chairman His
Excellency, Chairman Prof. Nur Misuari;
Immediately convene the Tripartite Meeting among
signatory parties to the Peace Agreement,
namely, the MNLF, the GRP and the OIC, and with
H.E. Chairman Nur Misuari in attendance;
Upgrade the Observer Status of the Bangsamoro
being represented by the MNLF at the OIC to full
fledged membership;
Condemn the on-going terroristic acts and the
violations of the Peace Agreement being
perpetrated by the GRP its military hawks
against the MNLF, the sole and the legitimate
representative of the Bangsamoro People, South
Philippines.
Create a Joint Team among the OIC member states
to monitor the implementation of the Peace
Agreement and the Military Cessation of
hostilities.
Kindly initiate and enjoin all other OIC
countries for a Fund Drive Humanitarian
Assistance Program to the Bangsamoro people
through their sole and legitimate
representative, the MNLF, consonant with the
yearly resolutions of the ICFM and that of the
Summits of Muslim Heads of State and government.
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